A key paradigm impacted by over 20,000 satellites suddenly in orbit by nations who hate each other, is the definition of 'air space' and 'sovereign territory." Mi Casa Su Casa will no longer keep us safe. No nation 'owes' any enemy access to anything.

We can no longer trust our enemies not to openly attack without provocation.  And so the US and NATO must extend their models of multi-domain battlefields (MDB) to proactively remove any means of attack into and inside our borders.

In 1997, the US Congress passed legislation, known as the Kyl–Bingaman Amendment, that limited commercial satellite imaging firms from providing high resolution imagery of Israel. What US and Israeli leadership failed to predict or respond to, was the need to similarly limit data communications and navigational satellite broadcasts over and into Israel - as with the US , the Ukraine,  and any NATO nation - to block surprise attacks and enemy communictations.

Why Vertical Territory Matters: Space & Satellite Defense

We can no longer trust our enemies not to openly attack without provocation.  Our S&T advisory helps US government agencies and vendors incorporate world-class engineering and vision to extend old school policy models of civilian air control, into new multi-domain battlefields (MDB) models to lead product and program development; and to proactively steer intelligence analysis and vulnerability modeling.

Our diagram at right shows current US FAA air traffic control layers, which allow commercial jets free passage virtually anywhere. The chief uncertainty comes with "Upper Class E" (above 60,00 ft) or   "ETM" (Upper Class E Traffic Management), which NASA, FAA, and global agencies are in the process of trying to arrange into better cooperative effort. But ETM thus far only considers

traditional flight - jets, balloons, drones - and not satellite operations, the world's biggest danger for unprovoked military or terrorist attack. Because current Russian, North Korean, and other military jets, drones, and hypersonic missiles still require a satellite navigation uplink and reply back to even launch.

ETM, Space & Satellite Defense after the Invasion of the Ukraine, and the Horrifying Hamas Attack on Israel

Sometimes we do not want to be 'right' about our predictions. But our company has predicted for several years that current interceptor-based defenses would not withstand a concentrated attack. And that the Dome's failure rate of 10% would be devastating someday. That day arrived on October 7, 2023.

To understand alternatives to interceptor-based defenses, one must first understand the nature of guided missile, drone, and jet warfare. Other than fuel, the only common elements shared by each weapon is its gyroscopic and inertial internal navigation and its external satellite- or magnetic-based navigational signal. Russia, Iran, North Korea and other enemies still use largely old missiles and fleet, and these still use largely US GPS signal. Very old school. To eliminate missile or drone guidance, or hypersonic flight into an attack position, all that is required at the end of the day is the elimination of navigational signal. Unless very near-based, short-range point and shoot missiles are used.

Because the GPS satellites  - or Galileo or the data communciations satellites (Glonass is still viewed as too unstable to be reliably used over any distance, and Putin did not even trust it to fire into neighboring Ukraine) -  are constantly moving in orbit around the earth, any missile, jet, ship, or drone must transition through multiple GPS zones as it progresses along its trajectory. Even traveling a distance of 20 miles may force an incoming missile to move through multiple satellite and ground station zones. Each new zone represents an opportunity to disrupt, deny, or acquire the navigational guidance directing that missile.

Leveraging US & NATO Ownership of Satellite Navigation

DC Strategic Group has led thought and S&T innovation  to leverage this remaining dependency on US GPS signal, by most world militaries; as well as future dependence on Galileo and Glonass networks; to provide an early and alternative layer of critical air defense. So as to lessen US and NATO dependency on interceptor-based solutions like Thaad or the Dome. Because those systems are only as good as their speed in reload and their supply of interceptors. The Dome was designed to withstand a limited number of unsophisticated missiles. But those days are gone. And Germany and the US Army have both found failure rates in Patriot missile defense systems as high as 83%.

Putin first tested US GPS signal in his first days of Ukraine attack, allegedly with a fall-back  alternative of using RFID guidance (which the US also built and can impact but has never thought to do so). FInding a free and open playing field, he did what he had said in Russian press announcements he would do and obliterated the Ukraine using US military GPS signal. And as Putin predicted, the US did nothing in response to limit his use.

To counter such enemy use of our own satellite navigational signal to attack US or friendly targets, especially civilians, we have urged US leadership since 2017 to block the return downlink back to the every identified enemy device or weapon from the source - the satellite. And we have demonstrated numerous ways to do so, even when the GPS receiver or other electronics, or drone OS is not pre-loaded with a known identifier or  ISR mechanism.

• Someday our lives might depend on US and NATO ability to block any enemy use of navigational signal enroute to and over any Western target. Without precision guidance, hypersonic jets, drones, and missiles cannot operate.

• Re-defining airspace to extend a nation's sovereign territory up into space, past the Karman line, effectively allows that nation to restrict attack, espionage, or even enemy cellular or data communications inside its borders. As it should be.

• This 'passive defense' or withdrawal of vertical air space, or withdrawal of use of any communications or navigational satellite signal over US or NATO or other friendly territory by Russia, NK, Iran, or other enemy or terrorist, goes against prevailing international precedent but not prevailing international law.